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In the context of a principal-agent model where veriﬁcation of an agent’s eﬀort is endoge-
nously determined through strategic interactions between contracting parties, we derive a necce-
sary and suﬁcient condition to achieve the ﬁrst best with a non-contingent or incomplete con-
tract.
These conditions relate the Principal’s beneﬁt, the Agent’s cost, the probability of winning
and the cost of litigation. Also, these conditions are found to be more general than the ones
established in Ishiguro (2002) within a similar setup.
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This paper presents a principal-agent model involving a moral hazard problem and endogenous
veriﬁcation of the agent’s eﬀort, a neccesary and suﬁcient condition is derived to achieve the ﬁrst
best with a non-contingent contract.
Most agency models assume that the agent’s eﬀort is non-veriﬁable, and non-contractable as
a consecuence. Others assume the contrary, that the agent’s action is veriﬁable and is then con-
tractable. In other words, they treat veriﬁability of the agent’s eﬀort as an exogenous variable.
Other papers make veriﬁability contingent on some ex-ante variables, with the result that eﬀort
could be veriﬁable in some circunstances.
Unlike these papers, we model an environment where veriﬁcation of an agent’s eﬀort is en-
dogenously determined through strategic interactions between the contracting parties. An agent’s
eﬀort can be observed perfectly by both parties. A third party, a court of law, is able to observe
it just imperfectly. In case of breach, the aﬀected party could make an additional eﬀort, namely
hire lawyers and collect evidence, in order to increase the probability that the court will be able
to observe the agent’s eﬀort. However, this veriﬁcation eﬀort is ineﬃcient because it does not add
any value and could be avoided.
Ishiguro (2002) investigated the optimal contract design in a principal-agent setup where the
agent could spend resources to verify its action in a court of law. Ishiguro derived a necessary
and suﬃcent condition relating to the cost of going to court, the probability of verifying the action
taken, and the cost of the optimal action under which the ﬁrst best can be induced with a "three-
step" wage scheme. Payment under this scheme is contingent on the level of eﬀort, as it assigns a
diﬀerent wage level for each level of eﬀort, therefore making it a complete contract. As a result the
principal is the only one with incentives to breach the contract, through paying a lower wage than
that established in the contract once the agent has chosen his level of eﬀort.1 In this setup, the
agent is the only one that may want to go to court.
1This is so because Ishiguro (2002) additionally assumes that any payment is costlessly veriﬁable by court. We
maintain this assumption.
2We modiﬁed one angle assumption of Ishiguro’s setup: we assume that the same veriﬁcation
technology available to the agent is also available to the principal. Our goal is then to derive a
neccesary and suﬁcient condition to achieve the ﬁrst best with a non-contingent wage scheme that
establishes one level of payment and eﬀort. Once this an "incomplete contract" is signed, the
incentive to breach the contract and go to court are reversed. Now, as the agent recieves a ﬁxed
salary he is the one with the incentive to exert a lower level of eﬀort, and the principal could be
ready to go to court. In this setup, we characterize when the ﬁrst best can be implemented with a
non-contingent contract, and show that this condition is weaker than Ishiguro’s. That is, whenever
the ﬁrst best can be implemented with a contingent contract, it also can be implemented with a
non-contingent contract, and the converse is not true.
Our result is in the same vein of Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Willington (2003) where
contracts are optimally incomplete. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: previous literature
is reviewed in section two; the model is presented and solved in section tres; section four establishes
the relation with Ishiguro (2002); and conclusions are presented in section ﬁve. Proofs missing from
the text are including in the appendix.
2. Literature Review
In this section, we review two areas of the literature: incomplete contract theory and agency models
with endogenous veriﬁability of agent eﬀort. Regarding the ﬁrst area, incomplete contract theory,
the review is limited to studies relevant to our model.
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) remind us that in practice economic agents rarely write complete
contracts in the sense of Arrow-Debreu. Furthermore, they point out that frequently contracts are
excessively incomplete, meaning that variables which are veriﬁable, and therefore also contractible,
are not taken into consideration. The reasons which are usually given for this are two fold: the
existence of transaction costs,2 and the limited rationality of agents.3
2Coase (1975) and Williamson (1975, 1985)
3Term ﬁrst coined by Herbert Simon. In Simon (1991) he points out that most people are rational only in some
actions, and emotional in the rest. As a result, their choices are not necessarily optimal but rather those that satisfy
them.
3Due to the existence of transaction costs agents do not specify all the states of nature in order
to save transaction costs. In other words, incomplete contracts are written because it is very costly
and/or impossible to forecast future scenarios. On the other hand, bounded rationality means that
while agents are rational in their decision making, cognitive limits exist, namely, limitations to an
agent’s knowledge and/or capacity to calculate. As a result all the diﬀerent states of nature are not
necessarily distinguished, and the necessity to specify certain performance measures in contracts is
not recognized.
Bernheim and Whinston present an additional explanation. According to them, contracts are
excessively incomplete because it is optimal for the agents to sign incomplete contracts. This
characteristic is called “strategic ambiguity”, and exists when performance has both veriﬁable and
non-veriﬁable aspects, with the result that it is optimal for the agents not to specify in their
contracts some of the veriﬁable aspects given that they can not specify all of them. In the same
vein, our model derives the conditions which make an incomplete contract optimal in a particular
context of endogenous veriﬁability.
Willington (2003) makes a similar argument. It explores the role of a court, where it is costly
to litigate, in the context of a hold-up problem with cooperative investment. The study shows that
even in the extreme case that a court can not obtain any information regarding the actual investment
level, a non-contingent contract can assist the parties with their implementation problem.4
Regarding the second area, the vast majority of existing agency models assume that certain
variables are veriﬁable while others are not. Two main exceptions are proposed in law and economics
literature, and Costly State Veriﬁcation (CSV) models. The ﬁrst set of models, even though these
belong to another literature with distinct objectives and motivations 5, have modelled the litigation
process as a rent-seeking game. Compared to these, our model is extremely simple as the decision
of the court only depends on the resources that the aﬀected party invested in the process 6.
4This result contrasts with the negative result of Che and Hausch (1999) who show that contracting has no value
in the case of cooperative investment because no contract out performs the null contract.
5Such as analizing optimality of fee shifting rule and comparing judicial regimes (inquisitorial vs adversarial),
amongst others.
6For example, in Bernardo et al. (2000) and Sanchirico (2000), court decision depends additionaly on past actions
4The second exception to the above are the Costly State Veriﬁcation (CSV) models which en-
dogenize the veriﬁability of exogenous state variables.7.I nc o n t r a s tt ot h i s ,t h ee ﬀort of the agent
in our model is not a variable of state but an endogenous variable determined by the interaction
between parties.
Kvaloy and Olsen (2004) analyze an agency model with ex-ante endogenous veriﬁability in a
context of repeated interaction. This means that the veriﬁability of the agent’s eﬀort depends
on the principal writing an explicit contract before the start of the relationship. In contrast to
these authors, our study analyzes only one interaction and, more importantly, that veriﬁability is
determined by the court following the breach of contract, which can only occur after commencment
of the relationship.
Going one step further, Ishiguro (2002) 8 endogenizes the veriﬁability of the variable in an agency
model, giving rise to the problem of moral hazard: the agent’s eﬀort. In this setup, the agent is
able to go to court in case of breach9. Through exerting an additional eﬀort during the trial, a
veriﬁcation eﬀort such as hiring lawyers and collecting evidence, the agent increases the probability
of the court discovering the breach. Ishiguro derived a necessary and suﬃcent condition relating
to the cost of going to court, the probability of verifying the action taken, and the cost of the
optimal action under which the ﬁrst best can be induced with a "three-step" wage scheme. This
wage scheme is a complete contract since payment is contingent on the level of eﬀort, such that a
diﬀerent wage level is assigned for each level of eﬀort.
Additionally, a couple of studies that analyze endogenous veriﬁability in the context of incom-
plete contracts, but with diﬀerent goals. Zhang and Zhu (2000) show that even if a court can only
imperfectly observe the actions of the parties, as long as the court is independent of those parties
(ie. is not unduly inﬂuenced by the parties during the trial), it is still possible to achieve optimal
results. In other words, courts do not need to perfectly observe the actions of the parties in order to
of the parties. In a car accident, someone that have not taken all precautions it is more likely to be found guilty.
7A generalization of these models could be found in Krasa and Villamil (2000).
8Another relevant work would be Yanagawa (1998) but we can not access to it.
9As mentioned, in Ishiguro’s setup the principal is the only one with incentives to breach the contract, through
paying a lower wage that the one established in the contract once the agent have chosen his level of eﬀort.
5reach optimal social outcomes. However achieving in an incomplete contract framework, this result
is not surprising because even in the conventional principal-agent model with moral hazard, we only
need the result to be correlated with the agent’s eﬀort to implement the ﬁrst best.10 Nonetheless,
as we already saw Willington (2003) shows that even under the extreme case that a court can not
obtain information regarding the actual investment level, a non-contingent contract can assist the
parties with their implementation problem.
On the other hand, Usman (2002) introduces the problem of moral hazard in the conduct of the
judge who has to exert eﬀort in its ruling and whose actions are not observable. In this scenario,
even though the cost of the eﬀort for the judge is low, low levels of veriﬁability of parties actions
are obtained.
3. The Model
Consider a simple agency model. A principal hire an agent to perform a task from which he obtains
utility. In particular, the agent has to exert a level of eﬀort e ∈ [e,¯ e] at a cost of C(e),a n dw i l l
receive a transfer w from the principal. The principal gets a utility of V (e).
We assume that both players: (S1) are risk neutral and (S2) have reserve utility equal to zero;
therefore their payoﬀsa r e :V (e) − t and t − C(e). In addition, we futher assume that (S3):
V 0 > 0,V 00 ≤ 0
C0 > 0,C 00 > 0 with C(0) = 0 and V 0(0) >C 0(0),
In case of breach, the aﬀected party can go to court, exert some "veriﬁcation" eﬀort x ∈ [0,Xmax]
so that the court will verify agent’s eﬀort with probability P(x). The cost of going to court is g(x)
and we assume that (S4):
P0 > 0,P 00 < 0 with P(0) = 0 and P(Xmax) < 1,
g0 > 0,g 00 ≥ 0 with g(0) = 0
10Formally, we need that agent’s eﬀort improves the outcome in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. See
Laﬀont and Martimort (2002), chapter 4.
6Futher, we assume that (S5) the court only imposes expected damages in a case of breach.
That is, if the court ﬁnds that one party has breached the contract, then this party has to make
a monetary transfer to the other that exactly compensates the loss generated by the breach. The
aﬀected party will be as well oﬀ as if the contract were fully performed.11 In terms of our variables,
if the contract stipulated a level of eﬀort E and the agent undertook a lower level e<E , then the
court would impose damages for ∆ = V (E) − V (e) if it discovers the breach.12
Complete and Incomplete Contracts
As noted earlier, the novelty in our model with respect to the existing literature is our as-
sumption that (S6) the type of contract between principal and agent is a non-contingent one: it
establishes one level of payment and, one level of eﬀort. This means that even though ex-ante parties
can specify whatever the level of eﬀort E ∈ [e,¯ e] a n da na s s o c i a t e dp a y m e n tw(E), once both par-
ties have reached an agreement on a determined contract their values remains ﬁxed (E,w).Without
a loss of generality we also assume that e =0 .
In addition, we also assume that (S7) the payment w received by the agent is veriﬁable by a
court at no cost. Therefore, if the contract is just a pair (E,w),the principal would never pay
w0 6= w.
On the other hand, the agent will always receive a ﬁxed salary w, no matter his level of eﬀort.
Even more, in the case the principal takes him to court, his breach is only discovered with a
probability P(x).Consequently, the agent is the only party which holds an incentive to breach the
contract and, unlike Ishiguro (2002), the principal is now the party who will seek to go to court.
Timing
The timing of the model is the following. In the ﬁrst stage, the principal oﬀers a contract (E,w)
to the agent. If the agent accepts; the game passes to the second phase. In this the agent chooses
his level of optimal eﬀort based on the signed contract e ∈ [e,¯ e] . In the third phase, the principal
11We are ruling out the posibility that the court imposes a very large penalty so that neither party would ever
breach the contract. We are taking this assumption from Ishiguro’s setup too (full penalty contracts are not allowed).
12In Ishiguro (2002), the expected damage is ∆ = W − w,w h e r eW is the contracted payment and w ≤ W is the
one paid by the principal.
7observes the level of eﬀort of the Agent and, if this is diﬀerent to that speciﬁed in the contract, the
Principal decides whether or not to go to court. In the case that he or she decides to do so, the
Principal chooses in addition its level of veriﬁcation eﬀort x.
Figure 1: Timing of the model
P offers contract 
(E,w) to the A
If A accepts, she 
chooses e ∈ [e,ē ], 
at a cost of C(e)
If P goes to court he chooses 
his optimal verification effort  x 
t=0 t=1 t=3
P observes e and 
decides wheter or not 
to go to court
t=2
Figure 2: Estructure of the Game















From a social point of view, any veriﬁcation eﬀort is ineﬃcient as it provokes costs g(x),w h i c h
could be avoided. As a result, we deﬁne the ﬁrst best as a situation in which the principal does
not go to court and the beneﬁts of the agent-principal relation are maximized. The ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l
of eﬀort is then:
max
e Principal beneﬁt + Agent beneﬁt =[ V (e) − W]+[ W − C (e)]= V (e) − C (e)
eFB : V 0(eFB)=C0 ¡
eFB¢
(1)
Inducible levels of eﬀort through an incomplete contract
Next, we characterize the levels of eﬀort which can be induced through an incomplete contract
(e,w) such that the Principal does not go to court. We ﬁrst focus in this and then characterize
when the ﬁrst best can be reached. Solving game by backwards induction, we can show:
Proposition 1.










∆(E,e)=V (E) − V (e)
E(ˆ e) solves V (E)=∆∗ + V (ˆ e), and






ˆ e : C(ˆ e)=C(˜ e(ˆ e)) + ∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e(ˆ e)).P(x∗(∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e(ˆ e)))), if E(ˆ e) ≤ ¯ e
ˆ e : V (¯ e) − V (ˆ e)=∆∗, otherwise
9Then, ˆ e can be induced without reaching the court stage with the contract (E(ˆ e),C(ˆ e)) if and
only if ˆ e ≤ ˆ emax.
Proof:
We will characterize the equilibria in which ˆ e can be induced.
Stage III
Given a contract (E,w) a n da ne ﬀort level chosen by the agent (e), the principal should decide
his level of eﬀort in the court. This eﬀort will be successful with a probability of P(x) and has a
cost of g(x).
This problem can be written as:
max
x ∈ X
P(x).∆(E,e)+V (e) − w − g(x)
Finding the ﬁrst and second order conditions, we have:
FOC : P0(x∗).∆ = g0(x∗) (2)
→ x∗ = x∗(∆)=x∗(∆(E,e))
SOC : P00(x∗).∆(E,e)−g00(x∗) < 0 (3)
Given the assumptions on g(.) and P(.), x∗ is uniquely determined. Note that, from (1) x∗ is
such that ∆ =
g0(x∗)
P0(x∗)
.Also, diﬀerentiating it, we can obtain:
P00(x∗).dx∗.∆ + P0(x∗).d∆ = g00(x∗)dx∗







That is, x∗(∆) is increasing. The larger the agent’s breach, ∆ = V (E) − V (e),t h el a r g e r
the veriﬁcation eﬀort the principal will choose. Also, x∗(∆) is decreasing in e because ∆(E,e) is
decreasing in e .
10Stage II
Given the contract (E,w) the agent chooses his eﬀort level e. As he recieves a ﬁxed salary
he will always be tempted to choose e<Eand breach the contract. He has two “reasonable”
alternatives: a)to choose the lowest e such that the principal would not go to court, or b) choose
an even lower e that maximizes his payoﬀ considering that the principal will go to court.
(a) ˆ e is the minimum level of eﬀort such that the principal does not go to court:




> 0. We will show that ˆ e is the minimum level of eﬀort
that makes the principal choose not to sue the agent.
Lemma 1
The eﬀort level ˆ e makes the principal indiﬀerent between whether or not to sue the agent.
Proof:
Given ∆(E(ˆ e), ˆ e)=∆∗.The principal’s utility of not going to court is V (ˆ e). On the other hand,
the utility of doing so is:
V (ˆ e)+∆(E(ˆ e), ˆ e)P(x∗(∆(E(ˆ e), ˆ e))) − g(x∗(∆(E(ˆ e),ˆ e)))
V (ˆ e)+∆∗P(x∗(∆∗)) − g(x∗(∆∗))

























P(x∗(∆∗)) − g(x∗(∆∗)) = V (ˆ e)
11In words, if the agent generates the breach ∆(E(ˆ e),ˆ e)=∆∗ through exerting ˆ e instead of E(ˆ e),
the principal is indiﬀerent wheter or not going to court. LQQD.
On the hand, given the contract (E,w), the eﬀort level e<Eexerted by the agent, and its
generated breach ∆ = V (E) − V (e); the net proﬁt of going to court of the principal ∆P(x∗(∆)) −
g(x∗(∆)) is decreasing in e.
d
de
[∆P(x∗(∆)) − g(x∗(∆))] = −V 0(e)[∆P0(.)x∗0(.)) + P(.) − g0(.)x∗0(.)]
−V 0(e)[P(.)+x∗0(.){∆P0(.) − g0(.)}]
−V 0(e)P(.) < 0
As by Lemma 1 the net proﬁt of going to court of the principal with ˆ e is zero, then if ˜ e<ˆ e his
net proﬁt will be positive so that he will always choose to go to court.
Even more if ∆∗ > 0 ⇒ V (E(ˆ e)) − V (ˆ e) > 0 ⇒ V (E(ˆ e)) >V(ˆ e) ⇒ E(ˆ e) > ˆ e.T h a t i s ,ˆ e is
always lower than E(ˆ e).Also, diﬀerentiating ∆∗ = ∆(E(ˆ e), ˆ e), we obtain:













In sum, in the ˆ e − E(ˆ e) space ˆ e has a form similar to:






(b) Exerting ˆ e the agent gets a beneﬁt higher than any other that he could get in
court exerting a lower eﬀort e :
Given the contract (E(ˆ e),w) let’s suppose the agent exerts an eﬀort lower than the one makes
the principal indiﬀerent toward going or not to court e<ˆ e . The agent would choose this e so that
his expected utility of going to court will be maximized.13
Let ˜ e and ∆ = ∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e(E(ˆ e))) be this lower level of eﬀort and the breach it generates, this ˜ e
must solve:










C0(˜ e) − V 0(˜ e)[P0( x∗(∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e)))x∗0(∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e))∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e)+P(x∗(∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e)))] = 0 (6)
C0(˜ e)
V 0(˜ e)
=[ P0( x∗(∆(E(ˆ e),˜ e)))x∗0(∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e))∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e)+P(x∗(∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e)))] = [.]
⇒ ˜ e =˜ e(E(ˆ e))
SOC:













C00(˜ e) − V 00(˜ e)
C0(˜ e)
V 0(˜ e)




Equation (6) provides us with the optimal breach ˜ e(E(ˆ e)) < ˆ e given the contract (E(ˆ e),w).




C00(˜ e)d˜ e − V 00(˜ e)d˜ e[.] − V 0(˜ e)d∆{P0(.)x∗0(.)+∆x∗0(.)P00(.)x∗0(.)+∆P0(.)x∗00(.)+P0(.)x∗0(.)} =0
d˜ e
∙




− V 0(˜ e)d∆{2P0(.)x∗0(.)+∆x∗0(.)P00(.)x∗0(.)+∆P0(.)x∗00(.)} =0
d˜ e
∙
C00(˜ e) − V 00(˜ e)
C0(˜ e)
V 0(˜ e)
+ V 0(˜ e)2 {.}
¸




V 0(˜ e)V 0(E(ˆ e)){.}
C00(˜ e) − V 00(˜ e)
C0(˜ e)
V 0(˜ e)
+ V 0(˜ e)2 {.}
Analogously to the case of ˆ e, we can plot ˜ e(E(ˆ e)). This is immediate because of ˜ e(E(ˆ e)) < ˆ e by
deﬁnition. Therefore, ˜ e(E(ˆ e)) could be similar to:
14Figure 4: Optimal breach ˜ e(E(ˆ e)) < ˆ e given the contract (E(ˆ e),w)






∆∗ > 0 ⇒ ∆∗.P(x∗(∆∗)) > 0 ⇒ ∆.P(x∗(∆)) > 0
In words, as ˆ e leaves the principal indiferent toward going or not to court, whichever lower level
of eﬀort ˜ e(E(ˆ e)) < ˆ e exerted by the agent will be less costly C(˜ e(E(ˆ e))) <C (ˆ e) but it will also
generate him an expected loss of ∆.P(x∗(∆) > 0 because the principal will go to court.
The agent will choose ˆ e instead of ˜ e(E(ˆ e)) , if and only if:
w − C(ˆ e) ≥ w − C(˜ e(E(ˆ e))) − ∆.P(x∗(∆))
C(˜ e(E(ˆ e))) + ∆.P(x∗(∆)) ≥ C(ˆ e)
∆.P(x∗(∆)) ≥ C(ˆ e) − C(˜ e(E(ˆ e))) (b)
Note also that if ˆ e =0⇒ ˜ e(E(0)) = 0 and . Replacing these values into (7):
∆(E(0),0).P(x∗(∆(E(0),0))) >C (0) − C(0)
15That is, it is always posible to induce the null level of eﬀort ˆ e =0with the contract (E(0),0).14
By continuity, it is possible to increase ˆ e holding (b). On the other hand, as ˆ e increases the right




















= V 0(E(ˆ e)) − V 0(˜ e(E(ˆ e))) < 0 because V j < 0
On the other hand,
d
dˆ e






[C(ˆ e) − C(˜ e(E(ˆ e)))]









V 0(˜ e)V 0(E(ˆ e)){.}
C00(˜ e) − V 00(˜ e)
C0(˜ e)
V 0(˜ e)










V 0(˜ e)2 {.}
C00(˜ e) − V 00(˜ e)
C0(˜ e)
V 0(˜ e)








V 0(˜ e)2 {.}
C00(˜ e) − V 00(˜ e)
C0(˜ e)
V 0(˜ e)








14Notice that ˆ e =0also implies ∆
∗ = ∆ = V (E(0)).Therefore E(0) = V
−1(∆
∗).
16In sum, the diﬀerence among RHS and LHS is reduced as ˆ e increases. If they would become
e q u a lw eh a v et h a tf o rs o m eˆ emax:
C(ˆ emax)=C(˜ e(E(ˆ emax))) + ∆(E(ˆ emax),˜ e(E(ˆ emax))).P(x∗(∆(E(ˆ emax),˜ e(E(ˆ emax)))
On the hand, if E(ˆ emax) > ¯ e they would not equalize and (b) would stay as a strict inequality.
As a result, ˆ e could only increases until E(ˆ emax)=¯ e so that ˆ emax solves: V (¯ e) − V (ˆ emax)=∆∗.
LQQD.
We next characterize the conditions for eFB to be implemented. That is, for which functions
V,C,g,y P it will be true that eFB ≤ emax.
Corollary 1
If functions V,C,g,y P are diﬀerentiable and:




= ∆∗ > 0, and




Where: ∆ = V (E(eFB)) − V (e) for all e ≤ e ≤ eFB
The ﬁrst best can be reached with the non-contigent contract (E(eFB),C(eFB)) :
Proof:
Given the contract (E(eFB),C(eFB)), the agent chooses e = eFB in the second stage because




In the next stage, given that ∆ = V (E) − V (eFB)=∆∗ the principal chooses not to go to
court. LQQD.
175. Relation with Ishiguro’s Condition
Ishiguro (2002) shows under which conditions the ﬁrst best can be reached with a three-step wage
scheme, a contingent contract. This conditions are called "Condition N" by the autor:
Condition N:
The ﬁrst best outcome is implementable if and only if there exists ∆I =( w∗ − w) ∈ < and
x∗ ∈ X∗ (∆I) such that:
(i) ψ ≥ (1 − P (x∗))∆I, and





e is the lowest level of eﬀort possible
x∗ ∈ X∗ (∆I) ≡ argmax
x ∈ X





If this condition holds, it can be shown that exist payments w ≤ ¯ w ≤ w∗ and a eﬀort level
b e ∈ [e,e FB) such that ﬁrst best outcome can be implemented by the contract:
w(e)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
w∗ if e ≥ eFB
w if e ∈ [b e,eFB)
w if e ∈ [e,b e)
Next, we compare Condition N with the one we obtained previously, corollary 1.
18Proposition 2.
Suppose that the same veriﬁcation technology is available to the principal and the functions
V,C,g,y P are diﬀerentiable. If condition N holds then corollary of proposition 1 also holds. The
converse is not true.
Proof: See Appendix.
That is, as both parties can go to court and the primitive functions are diﬀerentiable; then
Ishiguros’s Condition N implies corollary of proposition 1. In words, under the conditions stated
if the ﬁrst best can be implemented by a contigent contract it could also be implemented by a
non-contigent contract.





Consider the following functions15:
V (e)=eP (x)=1− e−x
C(e)=e2 g(x)=0 .05 + x
Note that V 0 > 0,V00 =0, C0 > 0,C00 > 0,C(0) = 0, and V 0(0) >C 0(0).
Figure 6: Beneﬁt V (e) and cost C(e) functions for the principal and agent









On the other hand, the minimum of
g(x)
P(x)
is well deﬁned and positive. Consequently, condition
(i) of corollary 1 is met as well.









∗(∆(E(ˆ e),e)))] > 0
20Figure 7: Probability P(x) and Cost g(x) functions in court






























− x∗ − 1.05 = 0
⇒ x∗ =0 .3 y ∆∗ =
1
e−0.3 =1 .35 > 0
ii) FB: V 0(eFB)=C0(eFB) ⇒ eFB =0 .5
⇒ E(eFB)=∆∗ + eFB =1 .35 + 0.5=1 .85
Notice that ∆ =1 .85 − e ,we can plot P ( x∗(∆)).∆ and C (0.5) − C(e) for all 0 ≤ e ≤ 0.5.

















W es e et h a tc o r o l l a r y1(ii) holds because P ( x∗(∆)).∆ ≥ C (0.5) − C(e) for all 0 ≤ e ≤ 0.5.
In particular, the non-contingent contract that implements the ﬁrst best eFB =0 .5 is:
(E(eFB),C(eFB)) = (1.35 + 0.5, (0.5)2)=( 1 .85, 0.25).









∆I = ∆∗ =1 .35,x ∗ =0 .3 ,and:
(i) ∆I ≥ (1 − P (x∗))∆I, holds because P (x∗) ≤ 1, and
(ii) P (x∗)∆I =0 .35 ≥ C
¡
eFB¢
− C(0) = 0.25
In addition to that, we can draw the utility the agent can get exerting ˆ e and ˜ e(E(ˆ e)) to calculate
the maximum level of eﬀort that can be induced is ˆ emax. In the ﬁr s tq u a d r a n tw ep l o tt h e s ee ﬀort
levels and their associated payments (in negative) in the fourth, w − C(ˆ e) and w − C(˜ e(E(ˆ e))) −
∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e(E(ˆ e))).P(x∗(∆(E(ˆ e), ˜ e(E(ˆ e))))) respectively.
22Figure 9: Maximum level of eﬀort ˆ emax that can be induced with the contract (E(ˆ e),w)
The maximum level of eﬀort that can be induced is ˆ emax =1 .27 and is obtained with the
contract (Emax,C(ˆ emax)) = (2.63,1.61).
Next, we will present other group of functions such that Condition N does not hold but the
corollary of proposition 1 does.16
V (e)=eP (x)=1− e−x
C(e)=e1.4 g(x)=ex − 0.95









∗(∆(E(ˆ e),e)))] > 0
23Figure 10: Functions V,C,P and g that do not meet Condition N.



















V (e) and C(e) P(x) and g(x)






1 − e−x we can see that ∆∗:
Figure 11: Minimum of
g(x)
P(x)






























+0 .95 = 0
⇒ x∗ =0 .2018 y ∆∗ = e2∗0.2018 =1 .4972




As E(eFB) solves: ∆∗ = V (E(eFB)) − V (eFB) ⇒ E = ∆∗ + eFB =1 .4972 + 0.4312 =
1.9284
Ploting P ( x∗(∆)).∆ and C
¡
eFB¢
− C(e), for all 0 ≤ e ≤ eFB with ∆ = V (E(e)) − V (e)

































































In contrast with the previous functions we can see that Condition N (ii) does not hold, because:
(ii) P (x∗)∆I =0 .2736 ≤ C
¡
eFB¢
− C(e)=0 .43121.4 − 01.4 =0 .30800
25However, this new group of functions meet corollary 1 (ii),b e c a u s e :
P ( x∗(∆)).∆ ≥ C
¡
eFB¢
− C(e) for all 0 ≤ e ≤ eFB.
Therefore, within these new functions the ﬁr s tb e s tc a nn o tb ei m p l e m e n t e db yac o n t i n g e n t
contract but it can be induced through a the incomplete contract: (E(eFB),C(eFB)) = (1.9972,
0.30800).
Finally, we again plot ˆ e and ˜ e∗(E(ˆ e)) and their payments (in negative) in the in the ﬁrst and
fourth quadrant to graphically ﬁnd the maximum level of eﬀort that can induce ˆ emax.In this case,
we have that ˆ emax =0 .88 and it is induced by the contract (E(ˆ emax),C(ˆ emax)) = (2.38,0.83).
Figure 13: Maximum level of eﬀort ˆ emax that can be induced with the contract (E(ˆ e),w)
267. Conclusions
This paper investigates the conditions under which an incomplete contract, a non-contingent wage
scheme that establishes one level of payment and eﬀort, can be optimal in the context of an agency
model where the veriﬁcation of an agent’s eﬀort is endogenously determined.
Previously, Ishiguro (2002) investigated the optimal contract design in such a setup and derived
a necessary and suﬃcent condition under which the ﬁrst best can be induced with a ”three-step”
wage scheme. In other words, he proposed a complete contract, a diﬀerent wage level for each level
of eﬀort to implement the ﬁrst best.
We modiﬁed Ishiguro’s (2002) setup by allowing the principal to go to court and assuming
he has the same veriﬁcation technology available. As a consequence, the incentives to breach the
contract are reversed and now is the principal the one who has the incentives to go to court.
In this "modiﬁed" setup, we derive a neccesary and suﬁcient condition to achieve the ﬁrst best
with a non-contingent or incomplete contract. Assuming the functions are diﬀerentiable, these
conditions relate the Principal’s beneﬁt, the Agent’s cost, the probability of winning and the cost
of the litigation. Moreover, this condition is found to be more general than the one established in
Ishiguro (2002) within his setup.
In equilibrium, the contract is always breached by the agent. Knowing this in advance, the
principal writes a contract that speciﬁes a level of eﬀort higher than the one he is trying to induce
and a wage that exactly compensates this "induced" level of eﬀort. Therefore, the optimal contract
is such that it gives the incentives to the agent to make the eﬀort level that the principal is trying
to induce. At the same time, it prevents the principal from going to court because his expected
beneﬁt equals his cost of doing so.
Likewise in Willington (2003), this result goes through the lines proposed by Bernheim y Whin-
ston (1998) in the sense that a model is presented in which incomplete contracts is optimal. In
simple words, this results may give a plausible explanation of why in real life situations contracts
are much simplier than the ones suggested in the literature. It may be that parties do not need
these sophisticated mechanisms because with simple contracts they may achieve optimal outcomes.
278. Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
a) Proposition 2 (i) ⇔ Condition N (i) if the same veriﬁcation technology is available to
the principal and the functions V,C,g,y P are diﬀerentiable




= ∆∗ ∈ < and ∆∗ > 0 so that corollary of proposition 1 (i) holds. Given that




⇒ ψ = ∆∗.
Additionally, given that ∆∗ > 0
⇒ 0 <x ∗(∆∗)
⇒ 0 <P(x∗(∆∗))
⇒ 0 > −P(x∗(∆∗))
⇒ 1 > 1 − P(x∗)
⇒ ∆∗ > [1 − P(x∗)]∆∗
⇒ ψ ≥ [1 − P(x∗)]∆∗
Therefore, we found one ∆I = ∆∗ =m i n
g(x)
P(x)
so that Condition N (i) holds.
a.2) Condition N (i)⇒Condition 2 (i)
By Condition N (i) we have ∆I ∈ < and ∆I > 0 so that ψ ≥ (1 − P (x∗))∆I holds. Within








Therefore, Condition 1 (i) always holds because ∆I = ∆∗.17
17Notice, however, that optimal contracts implied by ∆I and ∆
∗are diﬀerent because ∆I = w
∗ − w and ∆
∗ =
V (E) − V (e
FB).
28b) Condition N (ii) ⇒ Proposition 1 (ii)




Also, for all e in e ≤ e ≤ eFB we have ∆ = V (E) − V (e) > ∆∗ = V (E) − V (eFB) > 0
⇒ P ( x∗(∆))∆ ≥ P ( x∗(∆∗))∆∗and C
¡
eFB¢




⇒ P ( x∗(∆))∆ ≥ C
¡
eFB¢
− C(e).Proposition 1 (ii)
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